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Agency, Partnership and Corporations
Glenn G. Morris*

AGENCY

Auto Leasing Companies-Principalsor Agents of Lender?
Two different courts recently expressed opposite views about the
legal character of the relationship of the parties to an automobile leasing
transaction. In both cases,' an automobile leasing company had acted
as an intermediary between an automobile dealership and an automobile
financing company in arranging to acquire a car to be leased to a
customer of the dealership. Had things worked out as planned, the
automobiles would have been purchased from the dealership with money
provided by the financing company, the cars would have been titled in
the name of an affiliate of the financing company-which would have
acted as lessor to the dealership's customer-and the customer would
have ended up the lessee of the financing company affiliate. But in
both cases, the money that was ultimately supposed to be paid to the
automobile dealership in exchange for the cars was passed through the
hands of a financially troubled leasing company, which used the funds
for other purposes and then filed for bankruptcy protection.
As one of the two courts pointed out, the technical question being
posed was whether to treat the leasing company as an agent of the
financing company, or as a principal party to two related contracts, the
first a purchase contract between the dealership and the intermediary,
and the second a sales contract between the intermediary and the financing company affiliate.' If the intermediary was the financing company's agent, then the dealership had a sales contract with the financing
company, and the financing company's transfer of funds to its agent
for payment to the dealership would not have satisfied the financing
company's obligation to pay the dealership for the cars. If, on the other
hand, the financing company had simply purchased the car from the

Copyright 1991. by

LOUISIANA LAW REviEw.
Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Duplessis Cadillac v. Creative Credit Services, 564 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 1st Cir.

1990); Willard E. Robertson Porsche-Audi v. General Electric Credit Auto Lease, 544
So. 2d 515 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 550 So. 2d 631 (1989).
2. 564 So. 2d at 339.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

intermediary, which had earlier purchased it on credit from the dealership, then the dealership had a contract only with the intermediary,
and when the intermediary failed to pay, it was the dealership that
would have had to bear the loss.
In both cases, the evidence on the nature of the relationship was
mixed. The payment terms made the arrangement appear to be a backto-back contract in which the intermediary leasing company purchased
the automobile from the dealership (with funds provided by the financing
company), and then resold it to the affiliate of the financing company.

But the terms concerning the title documents for the cars made it appear
that the cars were being purchased directly by the financing company
affiliate from the dealerships, with the leasing company acting as the
financing company's agent. The financing company had instructed the
dealerships to place the title to the cars directly in the name of the
financing company affiliate, and not to pass the title through the leasing
3
company, apparently in an effort to reduce sales tax on the transaction.

In effect, therefore, the financing company wished to have the transaction
treated as a single sale for sales tax purposes, but as two sales-backto-back-for purposes of allocating the insolvency risks associated with
running the payments for the cars through the hands of the intermediary
leasing companies.

Faced with these facts, the Louisiana fifth circuit gave greater weight
to the title document instructions:' If the financing company explicitly
told the leasing company to acquire the cars in the finance affiliate's

name, then the leasing company had been given express authority to
act as the financing company's agent in the transaction. That meant
that the financing company, rather than the dealership, would normally
have borne the risk of the intermediary's insolvency (though in this case
the dealership ultimately was held liable on other grounds). 6 The first
circuit, on the other hand, reversed a trial court summary judgment in

3. 544 So. 2d at 517.
4. The leasing company representative also testified that he was the financing company's agent, although this contradicted his contract with the financing company, which
provided that he was not to represent to anyone that he was representing the financing
company as its agent. Id.
5. Id. at 518, citing La. Civ. Code arts. 2992, 2996, and 2997. The court might
also have noted that the leasing company, under the court's interpretation of the facts,
was entering into the transaction in the name of another person, thus meeting the definition
of mandate in La. Civ. Code art. 2985.
6. The financing company checked with the dealership to make sure that the dealership had been paid for the cars before it released the funds to the leasing company.
The dealership told the financing company that it had received payment, when in fact it
had received only a check that it knew would not clear until the financing company had
paid the leasing company, and the leasing company had then deposited those funds. 544
So. 2d at 518.
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favor of the dealership and indicated that, subject to the facts to be
determined at trial, it appeared that the transaction was a purchase and
resale, and not a single sale in which the intermediary had acted as the
financing company's agent.7 Under those circumstances, it was the dealership that would have borne the loss that arose from the intermediary's
failure to pay.
It might at first seem tempting to suggest that financing companies
ought not be able to have it both ways in these types of transactionsto have them treated as a single sale for sales tax purposes, but to have
them treated as two-step deals-as a sale and resale-for purposes of
allocating the risks of the insolvency of the intermediary leasing company.
That argument might indeed be persuasive if the question being posed
was whether one or two sales had occurred for sales tax purposes,' but
the questions posed in these cases are not issues of publicly-imposed
tax law. Instead, the courts are being asked simply to determine as a
matter of private law the terms of the contracts among the parties.
Under contract law, subject to normal fraudulent conveyance and other
creditor-protection doctrines, the parties are supposed to be perfectly
free to allocate insolvency risks between themselves in any fashion they
wish. Indeed, had they dealt with this issue explicitly in their contracts,
there would be no real question as to how the issue ought to be resolved.
What the courts are being asked to do in these cases is to determine
what the parties should be deemed to have agreed to when their contracts
are silent on the subject; the issue of the correct legal classification of
the contractual relationship is just an indirect-and potentially distracting-way of asking that basic question. Justice would be better served,
therefore, if the courts would let the fair and reasonable expectations
of the parties control the classification of the contract, rather than
letting some abstract classification scheme impose a set of constructive
terms on the parties that they would not likely have expected at the
time they entered into their contract. As Judge Shortess suggested in
his concurring opinion in the first circuit case, the "classification"
question could best be answered in these auto leasing cases by determining who, as between the dealership and the financing company, is
best able to ascertain and deal with the risks of the leasing company's
insolvency in these types of transactions. 9

7. Duplessis Cadillac v. Creative Credit Services, 564 So. 2d 336, 339 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1990).
8. Since tax obligations are imposed on persons as a matter of public law, without
their individual consent, the fact that they desired and intended to minimize their taxes
would not be the controlling factor in determining how many "sales" transactions had
occurred.
9. 564 So. 2d at 340.
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PARTNERSHIP

Contracting Parties' Intentions Determine Whether Partnership
Formed
In two of the partnership decisions reported in the last year, Louisiana courts said that a partnership could not be formed unless the parties
to a purported partnership contract wished to form a partnership.' 0 If
they instead wished to dissolve a partnership," or to become co-owners
in indivision,12 then their wishes would be respected, even if their agreed
arrangements had some of the characteristics of a partnership relationship.
These decisions seem sound on policy grounds, but as a technical
matter they are not consistent with the bulk of Louisiana jurisprudence
on the subject.' 3 In theory, the legal classification of a purported partnership contract is not supposed to be something that is subject to the
control of the parties to that contract. "Mutual consent" to the contract
is indeed one of the accepted elements in all of the prevailing jurisprudential tests of partnership formation, 14 but the "consent" referred
to in these various tests is consent to the contract itself, not to the
legal classification of the contract. What constitutes a partnership is
supposed to be a question of law; 5 it is not supposed to depend upon
the consent of the parties. If persons consent to a contract that has
the characteristics which the law says are those of a partnership contract,
then under the weight of authority in Louisiana, they have become
partners with one another because they have consented to a "partnership" contract-whether or not they understood at the time they con-

10. Guillory v. Hayes, 576 So. 2d 1136 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991); Roy v. Gravel,
570 So. 2d 1175 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990). writ denied, 573 So. 2d 1118 (1991).
11. Roy, 570 So. 2d at 1179-80.
12. Guillory, 576 So. 2d at 1142.
13. See, e.g., Penn v. Burk, 244 La. 267, 152 So. 2d 16 (1963); Latiolais v. BFI of
Louisiana, Inc., 567 So. 2d 1159 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990); Cajun Elec. Power Co-op.,
Inc. v. McNamara, 452 So. 2d 212 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 458 So. 2d 123
(1984).
14. Penn v. Burk, 244 La. 267, 294-95, 152 So. 2d 16, 26 (1963); Darden v. Cox,
240 La. 310, 319, 123 So. 2d 68, 71 (1960); Carr v. Masters, 469 So. 2d 1147, 1149 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1985); John P. Harris, M.D., Inc. v. Parmley, 480 So. 2d 500, 502 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1985); Cajun Elec. Power Co-op., Inc. v. McNamara, 452 So. 2d 212,

215 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 458 So. 2d 123 (1984). See Morris, Business
Associations, Developments in the Law, 1984-1985, 46 La. L. Rev. 413, 413-20 (1986);
Morris, Business Associations, Developments in the Law, 1985-1986, 47 La. L. Rev. 235,

245-46 (1986).
15. Amacker v. Kent, 144 La. 545, 553, 80 So. 717, 720 (1919); Cajun, 452 So. 2d
at 216 (joint venture, but applying partnership law); Pennington v. Simmons, 138 So. 2d
189. 193 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1962).
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sented to the contract how their contract would end up being legally
classified. 6
As these two recent decisions suggest, however, that approach does
not make much practical sense where neither third party rights nor issues
of public policy are implicated, and where the courts are being asked
simply to interpret and enforce, as between the parties themselves, the
terms of a contract. In that event, the only functional purpose served
by classifying the contract one way or another is to trigger-or to avoid
triggering-a series of purely suppletive rules. Thus, when the courts
purport to yield to the parties' legal classification in these types of
cases, they are really doing nothing but treating the parties' purported
classification as an indirect means of rejecting the suppletive rules of
partnership law that might otherwise apply.
The only danger posed by this sort of ruling is that the parties'
"misclassification" of their contract might not really have been intended
by them as a rejection of the suppletive rules in question. Other things
being equal, most courts would probably prefer a more explicit rejection.
Still, if all the parties to a business arrangement have expressed their
intention to have their relationship classified as something other than a
partnership, it seems rather unlikely that any one of them could reasonably have understood that the suppletive rules of partnership law
were nevertheless going to apply. Absent some reasonable grounds for
misunderstanding, therefore, the parties' "misclassification" of their contract with one another should normally be respected-even if "incorrect"
from a legal standpoint-to the extent that it operates strictly as an
expression of the parties' intentions to reject some or all of these
suppletive rules. On the other hand, to the extent that the parties try
to use their classification as a means of changing their rights, duties,
or obligations under mandatory rules of law, their effort to classify
their contract should not be given effect. Private parties do not have
the power to override mandatory rules of law either directly or, by
misclassifying their contracts, indirectly. The terms of a contract do
depend on the intentions of the parties, but the legal classification of
a contract, once its terms are established, does not.
Property Ownership
A recent second circuit case, Johnson & Placke v. Norris,'" considered for the first time the question of what is to be required in a
"contract of partnership" in order for that contract to satisfy the
requirement imposed by Article 2806 of the Louisiana Civil Code that

16. E.g., Darden, 240 La. at 320, 123 So. 2d at 72; Carr, 469 So. 2d at 1149; Cajun,
452 So. 2d at 216.
17. 571 So. 2d 702 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990), writ denied. 573 So. 2d 1142 (1991).
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such "contracts" be written and registered before the partnership's ownership of immovable property is to be fully recognized.
Under Article 2806, the partnership cannot own immovable property,
even as among the partners themselves, unless the "contract of partnership" is in writing. As to third parties, the partnership's ownership
is not recognized until the "contract of partnership" is filed for registry
as required by law. A failure to satisfy these formal requirements makes
the partnership's purported ownership ineffective, and replaces it-to
the extent it is ineffective "-with co-ownership in indivision by the
partners.
In Johnson, a law partnership purported to own the land and
building that served as the firm's law office, and had filed so-called
"short-form" articles of partnership with the secretary of state. A lawyer
who had withdrawn from the three-person firm was sued by his former
partners for an accounting and damages. In reconvention, he sought to
partition the law office property on the theory that the filed short-form
articles did not constitute a "contract of partnership" as contemplated
by Article 2806, so that the law firm office was not actually owned by
the law partnership, but by the three lawyers individually, as co-owners
in indivision.
There was no question that the property involved had been acquired,
improved, and financed in the name of the partnership after the articles
had been filed with the secretary of state. But the filed "short-form"
articles contained only the name and address of the partnership and of
each of the partners, as required by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3403
(1991). Nothing was said in the articles about the division of profits,
losses or managerial powers among the purported partners. Moreover,
even though the short-form articles purported to incorporate by reference
a more complete partnership agreement on file at the office of the law
firm, the withdrawing partner alleged that no such agreement was on
file-or even had been executed-at the time that the short-form articles
were filed. 19
The court held that the short-form articles were adequate because
they complied with the minimum requirements of Louisiana Revised

18. If the contract is in writing, but is unregistered, the partnership's ownership is
recognized as among the partners, but not against third parties. La. Civ. Code art. 2806.
19. He also alleged that his signature on an undated long-form contract produced
in the litigation was either forged or obtained by misrepresentation or other illegality
(though he later admitted that his signature on the contract was not forged), and that
the short-form articles, because they purported to incorporate a document that did not
exist, constituted a mere simulation. The court held that the articles were not a simulation
because they accurately expressed the parties' intentions to sign a long-form contract, even
if such a contract had not yet been signed, and left it for the trial court to determine
whether the alleged misrepresentation or illegality had occurred.
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Statutes 9:3403 (1991), an ancillary to Louisiana Civil Code article 2806.
Reading the Code and ancillary together, the court concluded that a
document satisfying the requirements of section 9:3403 constituted a
"contract of partnership" for purposes of Article 2806's "third party"
filing rule.20 The court did not find it necessary to resolve the factual
issue regarding the alleged absence of the longer contract that the shortform articles purported to incorporate by reference; the short-form articles were considered adequate in and of themselves.
The court acknowledged that, by their very terms, the rules on the
filing of partnership contracts dealt only with the requirements imposed
to make the partnership's ownership of the property enforceable as
against third parties, and that the case before it involved strictly a
dispute among the partners themselves. Still, the court said, the shortform articles were satisfactory in this case because third parties had
already relied on the partnership's ownership, and because the events
that triggered the fight among the partners in this case arose out of
the defendant partner's early repayment of the mortgage on the property.
Although the court was careful to limit its ruling to the facts before
it, I believe that this potential third-party/inter-partner distinction ought
be rejected in all cases, without regard to any evidence concerning third
party reliance or dealings. A document satisfying the content requirements of section 9:3403 should be considered a "contract of partnership"
for all purposes under Article 2806. The single, uniform rule of section
9:3403 would provide for simplicity and certainty in the interpretation
of Article 2806, and it would be consistent with any discernable purpose
for imposing the requirement of the partnership writing as between the
partners.
As the court pointed out in its discussion of the third party rule
of section 9:3403, the Louisiana Civil Code already provides suppletive
rules concerning the division of profits, losses and managerial rights
among partners. The contract of partnership needs to provide for these
items in express terms only if the partners have chosen to depart from
the normal equality of rights provided by the Code. It would seem
unnecessary, therefore, to say that these items are essential elements that
must be included as part of the writing that is required to evidence the
existence of the partnership in order to allow the partnership, as against
the partners, to own the immovable property that it had purported to
acquire in its own name.
It is difficult to imagine how a literate person who had signed a
document which listed the name and address of a "partnership" and
its "partners," and listed the signing person as one of the "partners"
would not understand that the document purported to describe a part-

20.

571 So. 2d at 705-06.
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nership in which he was a partner. If the partnership evidenced by the
writing did not in fact exist, then a court would be faced with a factual
issue and a parol evidence problem-using testimony or other evidence
outside the writing to contradict it-but where, as here, there appeared
to be no dispute that the partnership did in fact exist, this form of
minimal writing ought to be considered sufficient for the "statute of

frauds" type function seemingly performed by Article 2806.21
Arbitration Clause Survives Termination of Partnership

In Levenson v. Steiner,2 2 the fourth circuit held that a provision
for arbitration of all disputes "arising out of" a written partnership
contract was enforceable in connection with a liquidation-related dispute
arising after the termination of the partnership. The original partnership

agreement in Levenson had been entered into among three partners. It
provided for continuation of partnership after death or retirement of a
partner, coupled with an obligation on the part of the partnership to

pay the former partner for the value of his interest. Disputes about
value, or any other controversy or claim arising out of the partnership
agreement, were required by the agreement to be resolved by arbitration.
At the time of the transactions in dispute, the partnership's membership had already been reduced from three to two as a result of an

earlier withdrawal from the partnership of the third partner. Thus, when
one of the two remaining partners withdrew, the number of partners

21. The exact purpose of Article 2806 is difficult to determine; it seems to represent
a continuation of pre-1980 law, which had combined several independent rules to arrive
at the formally logical (but practically questionable) conclusion that only partnerships
created by a writing could own immovable property. Under pre-1980 law, commercial
partnerships (whether or not formed through a written contract) could not own immovable
property, and all other partnerships had to be formed through a writing, either as a general
matter (in the case of universal and in commendam partnerships) or as a result of their
owning real estate (in the case of ordinary partnerships). Current Article 2806 continues
the basic thrust of the old rules by providing that partnerships may not own immovable
property unless the partnership contract is in writing. Oddly, however, even though Article
2806 seems designed to encourage the use and reliance on writings in connection with
partnership-related transactions in immovable property, the provision could very well have
the opposite effect. The act of sale by which a partnership purported to acquire ownership
of immovable property would obviously name the partnership as part of the written act
of sale itself. However, if the partnership so named was not evidenced by a separate,
written partnership agreement, then the effect of Article 2806 would be to make the
partners co-owners in indivision. Unless the name of the partnership happened to contain
the names of all the partners, the unexpected new co-owners would not be named in the
act of sale (except, perhaps, out of an abundance of caution as a means of dealing with
a possible failure of the partnership's title). Thus, the writing requirement of Article 2806
would end up being enforced by placing title in persons whose identities might well have
to be proven through parol evidence, in contradiction of the written act of sale.
22. 580 So. 2d 466 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 584 So. 2d 685 (1991).
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was reduced to one. By operation of law, this terminated the partnership." In the view of the withdrawing partner, it also terminated his
obligation to submit partnership-related disputes to arbitration. Without
a partnership, he argued, the partnership contract (including its arbitration clause) could no longer be in effect. The district court agreed,
and granted the withdrawing partner's request for an injunction against
the arbitration proceeding that the other partner had initiated.
On appeal, the withdrawing partner tried to distinguish an earlier
decision that had upheld the enforceability of an arbitration clause in
an employment contract in connection with a dispute concerning termination of that contract.2 The withdrawing partner argued that this
case was not controlling because it pre-dated the 1980 revision of Louisiana partnership law. The fourth circuit said that there was nothing in
the 1980 revision that raised any doubt about the earlier decision, and
held that the arbitration clause was enforceable in accordance with its
terms, even though the dispute being arbitrated arose in connection with
the termination of the partnership. It reversed the district court and
dissolved the injunction.
The fourth circuit decision was sound. There was certainly nothing
in the 1980 revision of Louisiana partnership law that would have cast
any doubts on the earlier arbitration case. But more importantly, had
the court accepted the withdrawing partner's argument, doubts would
have been created about the enforceability of all termination-related
provisions in a partnership agreement. If terms in a partnership agreement could not survive the termination of the partnership, then all
termination-related provisions would become ineffective at the very point
that they were needed.
Even from a purely technical standpoint, the withdrawing partner's
argument was weak. The fact that the partnership had "terminated"
did not mean that the partnership's existence as a juridical person had
disappeared for all purposes. Even after termination, a partnership continues to exist for purposes of its liquidation until that process is
complete. 2 And even if the partnership had terminated as a legal entity,
it hardly follows that an agreement clearly connected to the rights of
would terminate as a
parties upon the conclusion of their relationship
26
result of the termination of that relationship.

23.
24.
252 So.
25.
26.
Wright,

La. Civ. Code art. 2826; Levenson, 580 So. 2d at 468.
580 So. 2d at 468, citing Wright v. Round the Corner Restaurants of La., Inc.,
2d 341, 345-46 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
La. Civ. Code arts. 2834, 2835.
That was the reasoning employed in the earlier employment arbitration case.
252 So. 2d at 345-46.
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CORPORATIONS

Legislation

High Risks Createdfor Retirement Fund Transactions
In what appears to be another piece of anti-takeover legislation,
new sections 12:130, 130.1 and 130.2 were enacted to block the use of
pension plan assets in connection with the financing of corporate take-

overs. 7 Under these new provisions, a two-year, post-merger/change-incontrol "safeguard period" is created." During this period, transactions
affecting "safeguarded entities" are subjected to strict judicial review 29

and injunctive relief," and persons who during this period engage in
"intentional misconduct" which causes either the insolvency of the safeguarded entity or any damage to any "interested person" are required
to restore the entity's solvency and to "repair" any damage to an

"interested person" (i.e., any beneficiary of the plan), including attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest." "Safeguarded entities" are defined
as pension plans, retirement systems, or "any other fund that inures to
the benefit of the employees of a corporation" that is "covered" by
the Louisiana Business Corporation Law. 2 "Intentional misconduct" is

27. 1991 La. Acts No. 914, § i.
28. La. R.S. 12:130(l), as enacted by 1991 La. Acts No. 914, § 1.
29. La. R.S. 12:130.1, as enacted by 1991 La. Acts No. 914, § 1.
30. La. R.S. 12:130.2(B), as enacted by 1991 La. Acts No. 914, § I.
31. La. R.S. 12:130.2(C), as enacted by 1991 La. Acts No. 914, § I.
32. La. R.S. 12:130(2), as enacted by 1991 La. Acts No. 914, § 1. The meaning of
"coverage" by the Louisiana statute is unclear. Perhaps the reference to the Louisiana

statute was intended to limit the reach of the new provisions to Louisiana-chartered
corporations, but new "coverage" language was unnecessary if that was the intended
meaning. The term "corporation" as used in the Louisiana statute was already defined
as a corporation formed under the provisions of the Louisiana statute, La. R.S. 12:1(G)
(1969). Perhaps the term was used deliberately for the very opposite purpose-to reach
corporations other than those actually incorporated in Louisiana. An anti-takeover provision that was adopted in 1988, for example, purports to apply to non-Louisiana corporations that have certain connections with Louisiana. La. R.S. 12:140.11-140.17 (Supp.
1991); Morris, Business Associations, Recent Developments in the Law, 1987-1988, 49 La.
L. Rev. 277, 280-86 (1988). Also, the general merger provisions of the corporate statutes
"cover" foreign corporations in the sense that they describe how a merger or consolidation
with a foreign corporation is to be conducted. La. R.S. 12:111-116 (1969 and Supp.
1991). Thus, even foreign corporations combining with or having certain connections to
Louisiana might be covered by the new safeguarded entity provisions.
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defined as any intentional conduct" which has the *effectof3diminishing
4
the assets "being held in trust" by any safeguarded entity.
In view of the fact that few financial transactions occur through
an unintentional slip of the hand, the "intentional" requirement of the
statute may do little to limit its reach. It seems likely that most transactions affecting retirement funds are "intentional" in the sense that
the participants intend for the transaction to occur. Unless the "intentional" requirement is interpreted to apply to the effects of the transaction, the new statute will for all practical purposes impose virtually
absolute liability for losses suffered by retirement funds as a result of
transactions that occur during the two-year "safeguarded" period. 3
Unlike most anti-takeover provisions, 6 this one applies to all corporations that are "covered" by the Louisiana business corporation
statute, no matter how small or closely-held that corporation might be.
Thus, even in a small family business, whenever a merger, consolidation,
or change in majority voting ownership has occurred (which might occur,
for example, as the result of the sale of the business or the death of
a majority shareholder), a two-year high risk period is created following
the change-in-control during which any transaction that might have the
effect of "diminishing the assets" of an employee benefit plan will
trigger unpredictable, potentially enormous exposure for all persons37
whose conduct may be deemed to have caused the diminution in assets.
Cases
No Veil Piercing Despite Informalities
In Henry J. Mills Co. v. Crawfish Capitol Seafood, Inc.," the third
circuit affirmed a trial court's refusal to pierce the corporate veil for

33. Conduct that violates the new provisions is presumed to be intentional misconduct.
La. R.S. 12:130.1(A), as enacted by 1991 La. Acts No. 914, § 1. But conduct does no!
violate the new provisions unriess it is intentional, La. R.S. 12:130(4), as enacted by 1991
La. Acts No. 914, § 1, so the intended effect of the presumption is unclear.
34. La. R.S. 12:130(4), as enacted by 1991 La. Acts No. 914, § 1. Act 914 also
amended an existing portion of Louisiana's control share acquisition statute, to make the
filing of an "acquiring person statement "-which is normally optional-mandatory in
cases in which any of the shares being acquired are held in an account or fund on behalf
of a safeguarded entity. La. R.S. 12:137(B), as amended by 1991 La. Acts No. 914, §

1.
35. The "being held in trust" language, on the other hand, may be rhetorical overkill
that could have the effect of preventing these otherwise expansive liability provisions from

reaching retirement funds not formally structured as trusts.
36. See La. R.S. 12:131-140.17 (1969 and Supp. 1991).
37. The liability imposed by the new provisions is not limited to plan administrators.
La. R.S. 12:130.2(A), as enacted by 1991 La. Acts No. 914, § I.
38. 569 So. 2d 1108 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
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the benefit of a contractual creditor of the corpoiation. The case is
noteworthy because the corporation involved seemed to be organized
and operated in a fairly typical, though theoretically unacceptable way:
informally and without much regard for the statutory model of corporate
governance. The corporation in Mills was formed by three individuals,
who acted as the incorporators, officers and directors of the corporation,
and who apparently agreed to divide ownership of the corporation equally
in exchange for future services; no stock certificates were ever issued.
The corporation obtained approval for loan financing from the Louisiana
Department of Agriculture, and then interim financing from Breaux
Bridge Bank in the amount of $160,000. For some reason not described
in the record of the case, the permanent financing from the state fell
through, and the bank, having been taken over by the F.D.I.C., called
its loan. The corporation ceased operations, apparently having expended
some of the loaned funds on the renovation of a restaurant for use in
processing the seafood, and having processed seafood on a few occasions.
The corporation was never formally liquidated. A creditor of the corporation sued to collect roughly $15,000 due on open account, and to
have a materialman's privilege recognized.
The black letter doctrine recited by the court was unremarkable,
but its application in this case should be helpful to practitioners attempting to defend against a veil-piercing attack. The court refused to
pierce the veil in this case despite the fact that the corporation was
capitalized entirely with borrowed funds. The purported shareholders
were said to have contributed services to the corporation in exchange
for their shares, but the nature and value of these services were never
described in any formal way. No bylaws were enacted, and no minutes
existed of any shareholder or director meeting. Financial records were
'unavailable," and there was evidence that one of the shareholders had
utilized corporate assets in operating another business owned by the
shareholder.
The court considered the debt financing to be acceptable, pointed
out that neither bylaws nor minutes of meetings were required by law,
and said that the failure to issue stock certificates was "insignificant."
The court explained that the lack of financial records was understandable
in view of the corporation's limited, aborted operations, and ruled that
occasional personal use of some of the corporate assets was not a
sufficient commingling of corporate and personal assets to justify veilpiercing. The court even treated undocumented discussions among the
three purported shareholders as "shareholder meetings" that counted
39
against the veil-piercing argument.

39. Id.at 1I11.
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This is not the first Louisiana case that has been liberal in recognizing
a corporation's separate existence against the claim of a contract creditor,
even in the face of evidence that the shareholders operated the business
more as a proprietorship than as a corporation.10 These cases make
sense not so much on their stated rationales (the black letter law is so
vague that almost any result can be defended as a technical matter),
but on simple contract grounds. A person who sells goods or services
to a corporation on credit, without obtaining any personal guarantees
from the corporate shareholders, is implicitly agreeing to a form of
nonrecourse financing; he is agreeing to look only to the corporate assets
for the payment of the debt owed to him. Veil-piercing in this type of
case would let the creditor circumvent the terms of his contract, and
courts are understandably reluctant to let this happen. Unless there are
facts to suggest either that the creditor did not and could not reasonably
be expected to understand the nature of his contract, or that the shareholders were making factual misrepresentations, or were commingling
or transferring assets out of the company in a way that suggested a
lack of good faith on their part, the reported Louisiana decisions consistently refuse veil-piercing demands by the corporation's contractual
creditors-even where corporate formalities have virtually been ignored.4 '
Piercing to Non-Shareholders
Cannot Pierce to Non-Shareholder
Two decisions reported last year reached opposite conclusions about
the potential liability of non-shareholders for corporate debts under a
veil-piercing theory. One explicitly held that non-shareholders may not
be held liable under a veil-piercing theory, while the other seemed not
to be troubled by imposing such liability on a person who, as a formal
matter, held no such position. The latter decision seems better reasoned.

40. Other cases include West Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Daley, 476 So. 2d 554 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1985); Harris v. Best of Am. Inc., 466 So. 2d 1309 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 470 So. 2d 121 (1985); Cahn Elec. Appliance Co. v. Harper, 430 So. 2d

143 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Ceco Corp. v. R & M Indus., Inc., 416 So. 2d 166 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), amended, 425 So. 2d 709 (La. 1982); Kingsman Enter., Inc. v. Bakerfield
Elec. Co., 339 So. 2d 1280 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).

41. In this regard, the Louisiana jurisprudence is consistent with Section 25 of the
Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act (1985). This provision states that, in the case of a statutory close corporation (one
with 50 or fewer shareholders that opts into the close corporation statutory scheme), the
failure to observe normal corporate formalities is not a ground for imposing personal

liability on the corporate shareholders.
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In the first case, Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co.,42 a homeowner
obtained a judgment against the 98% shareholder of a foundation repair
corporation and the 98% shareholder's son. The judgment was based
on faulty workmanship on a job that the corporation had contracted
to perform. The suit against the corporation itself-which the court said
had no remaining assets-was stayed as a result of its filing for bankruptcy protection during the course of the litigation. In support of its
decision to pierce the veil, the trial court had pointed out that the father
and son had engaged in a number of irregularities that made it impossible
to determine accurately what assets had actually belonged to the corporation, and what assets belonged to the shareholders or to other
affiliated businesses. Among other things, the father and son kept little
documentation of corporate transactions. They asked customers to pay
them with checks made payable to them personally, and then without
telling the company's accountant about them, cashed the checks and
kept the funds in a safe. Moreover, in the year before causing the
corporation to file for bankruptcy, over $100,000 in corporate assets
disappeared, and following the corporation's bankruptcy, a new corporation began operating the very same business, with the same phone
number, and using much of the same equipment that had been used in
the earlier corporation's business.
Accepting these factual findings, the fourth circuit affirmed the trial
court's piercing of the corporate veil against the 98% shareholder. But
it reversed the judgment against the shareholder's son. According to the
court,
The purpose behind the doctrines of "piercing the corporate
veil" and "alter ego" is to protect a creditor in his dealings
with a shareholder who fails to distinguish, in transactions,
between the corporation and his identity as a shareholder. [Citation omitted.) Thus, these doctrines are applicable only against
the shareholders of a corporation. The doctrines are not applicable to employees and/or officers who are not also shareholders
43
in the corporation.
In contrast, the third circuit saw no difficulty in piercing a corporate
veil to a person who was not, formally speaking, a shareholder in the
"pierced" corporation. In that case, Withers v. Timber Products,Inc., 44
the corporation was held liable for a workers' compensation claim for

42.

577 So. 2d 1060 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted, 581 So. 2d 697 (1991), rev'd

on other grounds, No. 91-C-0963, 1991 WL 255914, 1991 LEXIS 3373 (Dec. 2, 1991).
43. 577 So. 2d at 1065. The supreme court later reversed the veil piercing itself,

finding inadequate support in the record for certain key factual findings, but it expressed
no views on the possibility of imposing veil-piercing liability on a non-shareholder.
44. 574 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 378 (1991).
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which it carried no insurance. The person who appeared to be in control
of the corporation had testified that the decision not to carry insurance
was a calculated risk that no one would get hurt, and that if someone
did get hurt, they would get paid only if the business was "doing
good. ' 45 Although this individual had formed the corporation, and had
formerly owned another corporation that had earlier operated the same
business from the same site with the same manager, he had purported
to swap 10001o of the new corporation's stock for some non-revenue
producing land owned by another person, a two-time felon who testified
that he was "judgment proof," had never visited the business that he
was supposed to own, and knew nothing about its operations or finances.
This purported 1000/o owner even lacked the power to sign checks on
the business account, while the "non-shareholder" did have this power.
Although the Withers court did note that there was no record
evidence that the purported stock swap had ever really occurred,46 the
court's decision did not turn on a resolution of this factual dispute.
Without any discussion of whether the person in control of the corporation was, as a formal matter, a shareholder in the corporation, the
court affirmed the trial court's piercing the veil to him.
In the only other reported case to consider this issue, 47 Brown v.
Benton Creosoting Co., 48 the second circuit took the same position as
the Withers court. It pierced the veil of a corporation to hold a creditor
of the corporation-a major corporate supplier-personally liable for a
workers' compensation claim owed by the corporation to one of its
employees. The creditor had for several years held a mortgage on the
assets of the corporation and a pledge of the corporate stock, and had
through its agents controlled the operation of the corporation. The
corporation's net receipts were credited against the indebtedness owed

45. 574 So. 2d at 1295.
46.

574 So. 2d at 1295. Presumably, the court meant no documentary evidence, as

there was testimony to the effect that such a transfer had occurred. Id.
47. In Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249 (La. App. Ist
Cir.), writ denied,
580 So. 2d 668 (1991), the court did pierce the veil of several affiliated corporations,
finding them to have been operated as a "single business enterprise." Technically, this
amounted to veil-piercing to non-shareholders, i.e., to sister corporations under common
ownership by a third person or corporation. However, this type of case is distinguishable
from those discussed in the text, for it involves the treatment of several affiliated cor..
porations as if they were a single corporation, not the imposition of personal liability on
a non-shareholder on grounds that his relationship to the corporation was, in substance,

similar enough to ownership to justify holding him liable under a veil-piercing theory.
Another case, McGregor v. United Film Corp., 351 So. 2d 1224 (La. App. Ist
Cir. 1977),
writ denied, 353 So. 2d 1335, 1341 (1978), held two corporations under common control
liable as "employers" of an.injured worker, but the result was explained through a "joint
venture" rather than "veil-piercing" theory.
48.

147 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
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by the corporation to its controlling creditor, but this indebtedness
constantly increased rather than decreased in amount. None of the
nominal owners of the business were ever consulted about the operations
of the business, and a purported 50% shareholder had not visited the
business in several years, and did not believe that he had any interest
in it.
Neither the Brown nor Withers court even noted that their results
were out of the mainstream of veil-piercing cases, so neither saw any
need to refute the view presented in Riggins that veil-piercing was limited
in its application to shareholders. But with the Riggins statement now
made part of the Louisiana jurisprudence, taking a position contrary
to the results in Brown and Withers, future courts might be required
to choose between these two competing views. If so, I would hope that
the Riggins statement 9 would be rejected and that the Brown/Withers
position would prevail.
Although it is true that the persons held liable under a veil-piercing
theory are almost always controlling shareholders of the pierced corporation, it seems wrong to suggest, as the Riggins court did, that the
formal positions of the defendants as shareholders or non-shareholders
ought always to be considered controlling in identifying the persons who
should be held personally liable for the debts of the "pierced" corporation. The very point of veil-piercing is to avoid injustice by disregarding the formal structure of a transaction or relationship in favor
of its substance-to impose personal liability on persons who have, in
substance, run their nominally incorporated business in a way that makes
it unfair to allow them to deny their responsibility for the obligations
of the business by interposing the corporation's separate legal personality.
But if the corporation's very existence is to be disregarded in a veilpiercing case, it hardly makes sense to resurrect the stock ownership
records of the legally nonexistent corporation as a means of limiting
the class of persons that may be found to have acted in a way that
justifies making them personally liable under a veil-piercing theory.
Withers itself provides a perfect, though extreme, example of why
the fourth circuit limitation on veil-piercing defendants should be rejected. A person might act, in substance, as the sole owner of a business
without holding that position as a formal matter. Indeed, formal share
ownership might be relinquished, as it seemed to be in Withers, for the
very purpose of transferring veil-piercing liability to another, judgmentproof person. If veil-piercing doctrine is to mean anything at all, it is
important that the de-facto owners of a business not be allowed to
achieve through a sham stock transfer what they would not be allowed

49. The fourth circuit decision in Riggins was reversed by the supreme court, but
on other grounds.
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to achieve through the establishment of the alter ego corporation itself.
This does not mean that all participants in an incorporated business
ought to be subjected to veil-piercing liability. It simply means that the
class of persons who may be proven by the plaintiff to have operated
an incorporated business as their "alter ego"-in the sense that term
is generally used in veil-piercing cases-ought not be limited artificially
to those persons who, as a formal matter, hold shares of stock in the
corporation being pierced.
PersonalLiability of Corporate Officer for Misappropriation
In Sencore, Inc. v. Boes Iron Works,50 the fourth circuit held a
corporate employee" personally liable for the misappropriation of property being auctioned by the plaintiff auctioneer. The court rejected the
defendant's argument that he could not be held liable for the misappropriation because he had been acting strictly in a corporate capacity.
The court cited Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:95 (1969), which states
that the corporate statute does not derogate the rights of any person
to sue a corporate shareholder, director, or officer for fraud. The court
also quoted the statement in Fryar v. Westside Habilitation Center, 2
that "[aln employee cannot shield himself behind a corporate wall when
he is the officer responsible for the corporation's acts in a particular
transaction."" The court concluded that because this was a tort rather
than contract case, the defendant could indeed be held personally liable.
Although I have already expressed my strong disagreement with the
Fryar language quoted by the court in this case, 4 I believe that liability
was properly imposed in this case because, as the fourth circuit stated,
the duty that was breached in this case was one that has traditionally
been imposed by tort law. The duty not to steal another person's property
is not a duty that unduly interferes with the freedom of the parties to
allocate contractually the risks associated with their transactions with
one another."

50. 562 So. 2d 1154 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
51. It seems likely that the employee was the controlling shareholder of the corporation, as the corporation bore his name, but the decision does not describe the defendant's
relationship to the corporation as anything other than "employee."
52. 479 So. 2d 883 (La. 1985).
53. 562 So. 2d at 1156, quoting Fryar, 479 So. 2d at 890.
54. Morris, Business Associations, Recent Developments in the Law, 1985-1986, 47
La. L. Rev. 235, 242-245 (1986); Morris, Business Associations, Recent Developments in
the Law, 1988-1989, 50 La. L. Rev. 211, 217-20 (1989).
55. For a discussion of the distinction between the contract and tort liability of
agents, see Morris, Developments in the Law, supra note 54, 50 La. L. Rev. at 220-26.
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Cash-Out Merger Used Successfully to Defeat Minority
Shareholder's FiduciaryDuty Suit

The case of Armand v. McCall,s6 began as a typical fiduciary duty
suit by the heirs of one of the original investors in a closely held
corporation, but ended up, along with the companion case of McCall

v. McCall Enterprises,," as a judicial affirmation of the lopsided allocation of powers granted by the merger provisions of the Louisiana
corporation statute. The plaintiffs in Armand had inherited 7.5% of

the shares of the corporation from their parents, and had apparently
expressed some dissatisfaction about the management of the corporation.
In compliance with the procedural requirements imposed in connection
with shareholder derivative lawsuits,

8

the plaintiffs first sent a letter to

the corporation in the nature of a demand that the corporation enforce
its rights against the controlling shareholder, and then filed a derivative
action alleging that the defendant had breached his fiduciary duties to
the corporation.

The controlling shareholder responded by causing the parent company of the corporation involved 59 to engage in a cash-out merger in
which the plaintiff shareholders were required to relinquish their corporate shares in exchange for a cash payment fixed, practically speaking,
by the controlling shareholders of the corporation° The plaintiffs exercised their statutory right to dissent from the merger. Although this
would normally have entitled them to overcome the corporation's offered
price with a judicial determination of a "fair" price, the shareholders

56. 570 So. 2d 158 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990), writ denied, 575 So. 2d 375 (1991).
57. 578 So. 2d 260 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 581 So. 2d 708 (1991).
58. La. Code Civ. P. art. 596.
59. Over a period of the two to three years preceding the sending of the demand
letter, more than 90% of the stock of the corporation had been acquired by another
corporation, one apparently controlled by the defendant shareholder. (The opinion issilent
on this point, except for noting that the defendant was a shareholder and officer of the
other corporation, and except for the fact that the other corporation bore his name.)
Although this case involved a merger with a 90% parent, substantially the same technique
could be used in most corporations in which the majority shareholders owned (or could
cause to be issued to themselves or their allies) two-thirds or more of the voting shares
of the corporation; only the formal procedures would change.
60. In theory, it was the corporate entity that set the price, but the corporation
obviously voted to do what those in control of the corporation wished for it to do.
Normally, in a merger, the plan must be approved by the board of directors (elected by
the majority shareholders) and by two-thirds of shareholder voting power present at a
duly convened shareholders' meeting. La. R.S. 12:112(A), (C)(2) (Supp. 1991). In this
case, because the parent corporation owned 900o or more of the shares of the other
company, and the merger did not result in the parent company's issuing or delivering
any of its shares, the merger did not require a vote of the shareholders of either corporation.
It could be carried out through a simple resolution of the board of directors of the parent
corporation. La. R.S. 12:112(E), (G) (Supp. 1991).
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in this case faced a procedural problem: under Louisiana Revised Statutes
12:131(C) (Supp. 1991), both a demand for payment and an escrow
acknowledgement letters ' were required to be delivered to the corporation
within twenty days of the date that the corporation mailed notice of
the cash-out merger to the shareholders. 62 In this case, the shareholders'
demand for payment was delivered in time, but the acknowledgement
letter was two days late.
Following the merger, the defendant shareholder attacked both the
derivative suit and the dissenter's action. In the derivative suit, he filed
an exception of no right of action on grounds that the plaintiffs were
no longer shareholders, and so no longer were entitled to bring a
derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. In the dissenter's action,
he argued that the shareholders were not entitled to the enforcement of
their rights because they had failed to comply with the twenty-day escrow
acknowledgement requirement. The defendant won on both counts. The
trial court granted the exception of no right of action in the derivative
action because-as a result of dissenting-the plaintiffs were no longer
considered to be shareholders, and it dismissed the dissenter's action on
grounds that the plaintiff's had failed to comply with the twenty day
period for the delivery of the escrow acknowledgement letter. The third
circuit affirmed both decisions, and in the derivative suit even adopted
the trial court's reasons as its own.6 3
In both suits, the court's reasoning was straightforward. The court
pointed out that derivative suits can be brought only by shareholders,
and according to the dissenter's rights statute, a dissenting shareholder
loses his rights as a shareholder (except his right to be paid under the
dissenter's provisions) as soon as he makes demand for payment under
the dissenter's rights provision." The shareholders had made demand
for payment in this case, and were therefore no longer shareholders.
They no longer had any right of action to pursue the derivative lawsuit.65
In the dissenter's suit, the court found that the statute imposing
the twenty-day period had not been satisfied, and rejected the plaintiff's
argument that substantial compliance should be enough. Since the statute
said twenty days for both the demand and acknowledgement letter,

61. The stock certificates representing the shares as to which dissenters' rights are
being asserted must be endorsed by the dissenting shareholder in favor of the corporation,
and deposited in escrow in a bank or trust company for delivery to the corporation upon
the condition that the corporation pay the amount determined to be due in accordance
with the dissenters' rights provisions. La. R.S. 12:131(C) (Supp. 1991).
62. Id.
63. Armand v. McCall, 570 So. 2d 158, 161 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990), writ denied,
575 So. 2d 375 (1991).
64. 570 So. 2d at 160, citing La. R.S. 12:131(H) (1969).
65.

Id.
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twenty days on the demand and twenty-two on the acknowledgement
was not good enough, even if the corporation had not suffered any
discernable prejudice from the two-day delay."
These two cases may be placed in better perspective by considering
the role that fiduciary duty suits play in the resolution of disputes
between minority and majority shareholders in a closely-held corporation.
Minority shareholders in such a corporation will often believe that a
substantial minority stake in a valuable business ought to have some
inherent economic value, value that is somehow independent of the
virtually unfettered discretion of the controlling shareholder over the
corporation's distribution of dividends, salaries and other economic benefits. This view is particularly likely among shareholders who were not
privy to the informal understandings reached among the corporation's
original investors, but who acquired their stock in some later transaction-such as a divorce or inheritance-in which the stock was treated
simply as another item of property that could be fully owned and
exploited by the person who was identified as its "owner." Shareholders
who view stock in a closely-held corporation in this way will often be
disappointed when the majority shareholders never declare any dividends
(they don't need to-salaries can be used to take care of the majority
shareholders and selected kin) and when they find themselves unable to
sell the stock for anything approaching their theoretically proportionate
share6 of the value of the business as a whole (the market price for
the minority stock is quite low since the present discounted value of
zero dollars in anticipated future dividends is zero).
When the new minority shareholders make demands for what they
believe is their fair share of the corporate earnings-based on their
nominal percentage of stock ownership-the still-active, full-time controlling shareholders will tend to see the minority owners as meddlesome
parasites, seeking something for nothing and sticking their noses where
they don't belong. Their demands may also seem to the majority shareholders to be in violation of the longstanding, though informal, understandings reached among the original investors about the company's
operations and distributions policies. Thus, a corporation that has been
fair, even generous, in distributing benefits to a shareholder who was
active and productive in the corporation's business may feel that the
shareholder was being fully compensated during his lifetime for his
contributions, and so may be rather stingy in declaring dividends in

66. McCall v. McCall Enter., 578 So. 2d 260, 263 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
67. Subject to few exceptions (principally in cases of classified shares and anti-takeover
measures), all shares are supposed to have equal rights. La. R.S. 12:51(C) (Supp. 1991).
In theory, therefore, the per-share value of a 49% stake in a corporation ought to be
the same as a 51% stake.
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respect of some theoretical residual value in the business purportedly
held by the nonproductive heirs of that shareholder.
These are difficult disputes to resolve. Both sides have solid grounds
for their views, and neither view can ever really be reconciled with the
other. Yet unless the shareholders have negotiated a buy-sell agreement
in advance, or the minority shareholder is willing to accede to the
majority's view by relinquishing his shares for a deeply-discounted price,
the law says that the two sides must stay together in the same corporation
and just fight it out. As a result, a breakdown in relations that might
be resolved by a partition or withdrawal in other types of property or
business co-ownership will often end up in a corporate setting as a
derivative lawsuit alleging various breaches of fiduciary duty on the part
of the corporation's controlling shareholders.
The fiduciary duty lawsuit is not an end in itself, of course, for
even if the plaintiff shareholder is successful on the merits of the claim,
a derivative suit will generally not result in a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff shareholder, personally, but only in a judgment in favor of
the corporation.6 8 The corporation is still not required actually to distribute the recovery to the shareholders, as a decision on the declaration
of dividends is thought to be a matter for the business judgment of
the directors of the corporation-the folks who just lost the fiduciary
duty lawsuit. On the other hand, since the plaintiff shareholder is still
in a position to force the controlling shareholders to defend all transactions in which they may be seen to have a personal interest-such as
salary payments-even "success" for the defendant does not finally
settle things. Any particular transaction may have survived judicial scrutiny, but a judgment in that case-for that transaction-is certainly not
res judicata with respect to all future transactions in which the corporation may wish to engage. The plaintiff therefore remains a problem
as long as he or she remains a shareholder. The only way to settle
these suits, permanently, is to buy out the dissident shareholders.
Thus, in the end, the fiduciary duty lawsuit is filed not so much
to resolve a dispute about management as to obtain indirectly what is
not supposed to be available under traditional corporation law: a mandatory buy-out of a dissatisfied minority investor. Even though the

68. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 596 (4) (petition in derivative action must include
prayer for judgment in favor of the corporation). A few decisions outside of Louisiana
have allowed derivative suit judgments to be granted directly in favor of the plaintiff
shareholders, in proportion to their ownership of stock, to prevent the defendants from
participating in a windfall from the corporate recovery. See Jannes v. Microwave Comninications, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 110
W. Va. 364, 158 S.E. 678 (1931). But see In Re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co.
Securities and Antitrust Litig., 387 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Keenan v. Eshleman,
23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (1938).
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plaintiff shareholder has virtually no chance of recovering anything
personally as a direct result of winning his fiduciary duty lawsuit, the
suit remains valuable to him as a means of imposing buy-out pressure
on the controlling shareholders.
What is important about the Armand and McCall cases, therefore,
is that the typical buy-out pressure from the minority investors got
turned around on them. The defendants' lawyers seized control of the

fiduciary duty suit by means of a squeezeout merger that left the minority
stockholders with limited and fragile rights that they ultimately ended
up losing through their failure to comply with a statutory twenty-day
demand and escrow requirement. 69 No doubt, that was good lawyering

by defense counsel. But it was not a fair way for the law to resolve
this dispute. Armand and McCall essentially sanction an expropriation
of a minority shareholder's stock even without the provision of a reasonable opportunity for judicial review of the terms of the expropriation.
Although it is possible in this case to criticize the court's reading

of the statute on technical grounds,7 0 the technical criticisms, even if

69. The only "out" for the shareholder that the court seemed to see was a contesting
of the lawfulness of the merger itself. 570 So. 2d at 160. (The court apparently did not
view an attempted assertion of dissenters' rights-in an effort to increase the price to be
paid for the shares-to be an objection to the lawfulness of the merger itself.) But there
seemed to be no doubt that the corporation had complied with the formal, technical
requirements of the merger statute. Id. at 159. And it is not at all clear whether a court
would allow a "fiduciary duty/unfairness" attack on the merger or whether, instead, the
dissenters' rights provisions would be considered exclusive of other "fairness"-based remedies. No reported Louisiana decision has dealt with the question explicitly, and decisions
outside Louisiana are mixed. V. Brudney & M. Chirelstein, Corporate Finance, at 73742 (3d ed. 1987). Some courts have been willing to enjoin a freeze-out merger if it is
being carried out for purposes of eliminating the minority shareholder's standing in a
derivative suit. Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981) (not enjoined because other
contractual remedies available to shareholder); Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc., 505 A.2d
757 (Del. Ch. 1986).
One Louisiana decision, Levy v. Billeaud, 443 So. 2d 539 (La. 1983), does suggest
that a merger-like transaction might be struck down as a breach of a duty of "entire
fairness" to minority investors, even if it is carried out in accordance with the letter of
the corporate statute. This reading of Levy would support the position that the statutory
dissenter's remedies are not exclusive and that mergers designed to thwart derivative suits
are unlawful. But, as a technical matter, Levy was written simply as a decision dealing
with the fiduciary duties of corporate liquidators.
70. In one decision, the court dismissed the derivative suit on grounds that the
shareholders had lost their standing as shareholders by the act of making the ."demand"
for payment under the dissenters' rights statute, La. R.S. 12:131(C) (Supp. 1991), while
in the other it held that the "demand" was ineffective to trigger their rights under the
dissenters' rights statute. From a technical standpoint, the word "demand" seems to have
a fixed, particular meaning under the statute; either the shareholder made a "demand"
as contemplated by the statute or he didn't. The statute does not seem to allow a
shareholder communication to be treated as a "demand" for purposes of giving up rights
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heeded, would not necessarily change the result.' The real fault in this
case lay not with the court's interpretation of the statute, but with the
statute itself.
Originally, dissenters' rights statutes were designed to protect a
minority shareholder from "freeze-in" transactions-from being forced
to accept stock in a new, merged company in exchange for his original
investment in one of the corporate parties to the merger. 2 Accordingly,

as a shareholder, without also operating as a "demand" for purposes of protecting the
former shareholder's rights as a dissenter. The McCall decision quoted the portion of La.
R.S. 12:131(H) (1969) that provided for the shareholder's relinquishment of his shares
upon the filing of his demand, but it omitted a later portion of the same subsection that
provided for the reinstatement of the dissenter as a shareholder in the event, among
others, that the shareholder should in any way lose his rights as a dissenter.
71. Even if the court had adopted the analysis suggested supra note 70, it would
have faced the question of how to deal with the reinstated dissenter. If the loss of the
dissenters' rights resulted in reinstatement as a full-blown shareholder, then the corporation
would be forced to choose between enforcing the terms of its cash-out merger and enforcing
its rights under the dissenters' rights statute. Under this approach, a dissenter could violate
the procedures of the statute with virtual impunity if the corporation wished to enforce
the terms of its merger, for if the company did not forgive the dissenter's failure to
comply with the statute, it would find him reinstated as a shareholder, thus defeating
the purpose of the cash-out merger in the first place.
On the other hand, if reinstatement meant reinstatement to the position that the
shareholder would have occupied had he not dissented, then the reinstatement would make
no real difference in the dissenter's position. He would end up being reinstated to the
very position-recipient of a low-ball cash merger price-from which he was trying to
dissent. In effect, the McCall court opted for this latter choice, though it did not explain
its decision in this way. But since the court might have reached the unfair result that it
did in a technically defensible way, it is difficult to say that the unfairness in the result
reached actually arose from a misinterpretation of the statute.
The statute worked unfairly in this case not because it was interpreted badly, but
because it was designed to deal with the exact reverse of the type of transaction that
actually occurred in this case-a "freeze-in" rather than "freeze-out" type of merger.
See infra text accompanying notes 72 to 75. In a freeze-in merger, the statutory "dissenter
or shareholder" choice works reasonably well. If a shareholder does not dissent, he simply
remains a shareholder in the surviving corporation. If he does dissent and protects his
rights, he gives up his shares in exchange for his dissenter's rights. If he later loses his
rights as a dissenter (e.g., by failing to satisfy the statutory notice requirements), he is
simply reinstated as a shareholder.
In contrast, in a freeze-out transaction, the choice is not "dissenter or shareholder,"
but "dissenter or former shareholder." If the cash-out merger is not to be defeated
altogether, the shareholder who is reinstated is reinstated to his entitlement to get whatever
it was that the controlling shareholders decided to offer. In practical effect, the shareholder
has his property expropriated from him against his will and loses his right to challenge
the price at which the expropriation occurred if he fails to satisfy what must amount to
one of the shortest prescriptive periods anywhere in the law: twenty days from the mailing
of notice.
72. In early corporate law, mergers required the unanimous consent of the corporation's shareholders. The dissenters' rights provisions were seen as the tradeoff required
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the shareholder was given the right to demand a cash payment for his
shares at their fair value. If the corporation and shareholder could not
agree on "fair value," the value was to be determined by a court in
what is generally known as an "appraisal" proceeding. The procedures
established in the statutes for the assertion of dissenters' rights tended
to be rather lopsided in favor of the corporation-with very short time
periods within which a series of steps had to be completed-in order
to counter the fears of critics of dissenters' rights. The critics feared
that minority shareholders would be able to impose unpredictable and
unmanageable cash-flow pressures on the merged enterprise by demanding a cash payment for their shares, rather than simply accepting
stock in the merged enterprise like everyone else. In effect, liberal
dissenter's provisions could be used by minority shareholders to destroy
a transaction that a majority of the shareholders considered beneficial."
The "freezeout" or "cash-out" merger, such as the one carried out
in this case, turned the dissenters' rights statutes on their heads. 7 4 Now
the merger terms were objectionable to the minority investors precisely
because they were not being given the chance to be treated as everyone

to reduce the approval requirement to a majority or two-thirds of shareholders; a minority
shareholder could not block the transaction for everyone, but neither was he required,
against his will, to leave his money invested in a company that had undergone the
purportedly "fundamental" change wrought by a merger. He lacked the power to block
the merger, but if he did not wish to remain in the merged enterprise, he was entitled
to assert his dissenter's rights to a cash buy-out of his investment. See R. Clark, Corporate
Law, at 443-44 (1986); Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for
Frank Coker, 72 Yale L.J. 223, 244-50 (1962); Lattin, A Reappraisal of Appraisal Statutes,
38 Mich. L. Rev. 1165, 1181-86 (1940) (describing dissenter and appraisal statutes as being
designed to "balanc[e the] interests between the modern corporation with its tremendous
powers to make change and the shareholder who is unwilling to keep his stake in the
company when there is radical change.... (emphasis added)).
73. Manning, supra note 72, at 233-38; Lattin, supra note 72, at 1183-86.
74. R. Clark, Corporate Law 508 (1986). The key to a freezeout merger is the ability
of the persons in control of the corporation to adopt a plan of merger that gives them
all of the stock in the surviving corporation, and gives cash or other property to those
shareholders whom the controlling persons wish to force out. That was not possible until
relatively recently; in early corporate law, all shareholders had to be treated equally in
the merger. R. Gilson, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 869 (1986); Weiss,
The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 624, 64157 (1981). In his famous 1962 criticism of appraisal rights statutes, Professor Manning
did not even mention the use of the statutes as a device for protecting shareholders from
being squeezed out of the corporation at too low a price. See Manning, supra note 72,
at 239-62. Today, that is undoubtedly the more important function of such statutes, and
the one that attracts most of the attention both in the courts and in academic writing.
See, e.g., Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985); Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977);
Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezouts, 87 Yale L.J. 1354 (1978);
Greene, Corporate Freezeout Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 487 (1976).
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else; the terms of the merger plan would call for them to receive cash
or other property (other than stock) in exchange for the shares they
had formerly held in one of the merging corporations. The minority
investors could not remain shareholders in the merged enterprise even
if they wanted to. And whatever cash-flow pressure which might arise
was actually created by the majority shareholders themselves, as a result
of their choosing to force the minority investors to give up their stock
in the surviving company. Nevertheless, since the same dissenter's statute
applied, the same remedy was available: a minority shareholder who
dissented because he did not wish to be forced to accept cash for his
stock would find that the statute protected him by giving him the very
thing he did not want: cash for his stock." Moreover, all of the complexities and short time periods that had been built into the statute to
protect the majority shareholders from minority abuses could now be
exploited by the majority to limit the minority's rights to challenge the
terms under which the majority had decided to expropriate the minority's
stock.
Although the dissenter's statute can still play a potentially important
function in protecting a minority shareholder from getting too little cash
for his stock in a cash-out merger, the short time periods and tricky
procedures still contained in this statute are not appropriate for the role
that the statute now most frequently plays. 76 These needless traps and
complexities work only to deny the minority investors the limited right
that they are still supposed to have to challenge the price at which the
majority shareholders are expropriating their stock, and they enhance
the ability of the majority shareholders to take the minority's shares at
any price the majority cares to set.
Under current interpretations of the law, squeezeout mergers allow
the persons in control of two-thirds or more of the outstanding stock
of a Louisiana corporation to expropriate the shares of the remaining
stockholders for a cash payment determined to be "fair" under the
dissenters' rights provision. 7 Moreover, the few Louisiana cases that
discuss the valuation of a minority investor's stake in a business seem
to accept the fact that the majority shareholders ought to be able to
carry out this expropriation at a healthy discount off the value that the
stock would have on a proportionate basis. 7 The Armand case goes
75. La. R.S. 12:131(E) (1969).
76. F. O'Neal & R. Thompson, O'Neal's Oppression of Minority Shareholders, §§
5:31, 10:08 (2d ed. 1985).
77. McMillan v. Bank of the South, 514 So. 2d 227 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied,
516 So. 2d 131 (1987); Giraud v. Gillis, Ellis & Baker, Inc., 488 So. 2d 1261 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1986).
78. See Shopf v. Marina Del Ray Partnership, 549 So. 2d 833 (La. 1989); McMillan,
514 So. 2d 227; Combs v. Howard, 481 So. 2d 179 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985), writ denied,
484 So. 2d 671 (1986).
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one step further, and upholds the power to do that as a means of
cutting off a lawsuit brought to enforce the fiduciary duties that the
corporation's controlling person was supposed to owe to the corporation
for the benefit of all shareholders. 79 The McCall decision takes still
another step, and holds that all of this can occur without judicial review
of the fairness of the price paid in the expropriation if the minority
shareholders fail to comply with what amounts to a twenty-day prescriptive period. It would be difficult to design a scheme more unfair
to minority investors.
It does make sense to allow some form of involuntary partition
action among the co-owners of a business who can no longer get along
with one another.'0 Indeed, it makes more sense to handle internal
disputes in this way than it does through "fiduciary duty" suits that
are purportedly brought in the name and for the benefit of the organization as whole, but which actually serve as vehicles for the resolution
of distributional conflicts that courts are ill-equipped to resolve. However, the "partition" procedure that now exists in corporation law is
much too heavily skewed in favor of the majority shareholder." The
court may have followed the statute in Armand and McCall, but the
statute does not deal with this issue as it should.

79. Although the court did not consider this issue because of the plaintiffs' loss of
their dissenters' rights, it would seem possible even after Armand to preserve the fiduciary
duty claims as a part of the judicial appraisal proceeding. If the company's value has

been affected by the majorily shareholder's breaches of fiduciary duty, then it would
seem appropriate to adjust the value of the company, and of the shareholder's minority
shares, accordingly. See Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 370 N.E.2d 345, 357 (1977).
There is also some support outside of Louisiana for the proposition that the merger itself
could be enjoined if it could be shown that the merger was being carried out as a means
of eliminating the shareholder's derivative suit. Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir.
1981); Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc., 505 A.2d 757 (Del. Ch. 1986).
80. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 74, at 1356 n.9.
81. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.

